The Ambiguity of Kant's Concept of the Highest Good: Finding the Correct Interpretation by Lin, Cheng‐Hao
355DOI: 10.1111/phil.12228
© 2019 The Authors. The Philosophical Forum Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
THE AMBIGUITY OF KANT’S CONCEPT OF THE HIGHEST 
GOOD: FINDING THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION
CHENG-HAO LIN
The aim of this paper is to resolve the tension between Kant’s doctrine of the high-
est good and his entire philosophical system. The concept of the highest good is 
the first major ambiguity of the doctrine. There are three pairs of ambiguities: 
immanent-transcendent; justice-perfection; and individual-community. They are 
able to form eight combinations. Corresponding to the various combinations and 
conceptions of the highest good, interpreters also conceive different reasons for 
the necessity of the doctrine as well as various conditions of its applicability. For 
example, some emphasize its religious dimension, whereas others understand it in 
the political sense. In this paper, I adopt a different approach in understanding the 
highest good’s systematic meaning as the moral confirmation, and suggest that only 
a transcendent, perfect and communal concept of the highest good can provide the 
most consistent doctrine. Additionally, it explains the importance of the different 
branches (such as philosophies of religion and of politics) of Kant’s system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the highest good has proven to be a thorny issue in interpreting 
Kant’s moral philosophy for some time. The so-called “highest good” in a stan-
dard understanding consists of “happiness distributed in exact proportion to 
morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy)” (KpV, 05: 110).1 
 1 References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason use the A (first edition) and/or B (second edition) 
pagination. References to other works of Kant give abbreviation, volume and page number from 
Immanuel Kants gesammelten Schriften, Ausgabe der königlich preußischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–). Abbreviations: Pro = Prolegomena 
zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik; GMS = Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten; KpV = 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunf; KU = Kritik der Urteilskraft; RGV = Die Religion innerhalb der 
Grenzen der blossen Vernunft; EaD = Das Ende aller Dinge; ZeF = Zum ewigen Frieden; 
V-Mo/Collins = Vorlesung-Moral Collins; V-Mo/Mron II = Vorlesung-Moral Mrongovius II. All 
English translations of Kant’s works are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel 
Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge UP: 1992–) except author’s own translation of Moral Mrongovius II.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is 
properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
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To put it in simple terms: a morally good man should be able to obtain the happi-
ness he deserves. Furthermore, Kant determines that the promotion of this con-
cept “is an a priori necessary object of our will and inseparably bound up with the 
moral law,” and if this is not possible, then the moral law is “fantastic and directed 
to empty imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false” (KpV, 05: 114). 
According to this claim, Kant further requires us to postulate God and immortal-
ity, which are deemed necessary conditions for the availability of the highest 
good, as the objects of a special kind of belief, known as moral faith. This moral 
faith constitutes the heart of Kant’s moral theology and his rational religion. This 
is the basic scheme of Kant’s doctrine of the highest good. However, these decla-
rations strongly violate our standard impression of Kant’s moral philosophy. 
Given that according to Kant’s moral doctrine of duty, the highest principle of 
morality concerns neither the possibility of realizing the objects of moral actions, 
nor whether the results of these actions bring any happiness to humans, how could 
the validity of the moral law be decided by the availability of the highest good in 
association with the implication of happiness?
Faced with these difficulties, there are two main tendencies in defending Kant’s 
doctrine of the highest good among multiple different interpretations. Some fun-
damentalists seek to emphasize the importance of the religious dimension of 
Kant’s moral philosophy and see moral faith as vital to the doctrine of the highest 
good. By contrast, secularizers try to cut off the connection of the doctrine of the 
highest good from moral faith and the philosophy of religion, instead interpreting 
this doctrine as only a specific application of Kant’s moral philosophy, usually via 
his political philosophy.2 Nevertheless, I think it is no accident that the doctrine of 
the highest good relates to Kant’s religious-theological and political-juridical phi-
losophy at the same time. Perhaps it is the case that both sides play a key role in 
making this doctrine reasonable.
In order to deal with this issue, however, we must confront another problem: 
there is, at least on the surface, no fixed meaning of the highest good in Kant’s 
 2 Beiser describes these secularizers as such: “True to their antimetaphysical program, these schol-
ars have defended a completely secular and immanent conception of the highest good, according 
to which it is simply a goal of human striving that need not involve the beliefs in the existence of 
God or immortality” (Frederick Beiser, “Moral Faith and the Highest Good,” The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2006) 589).
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writings.3 Across his works, Kant endows this concept with different definitions 
and descriptions. This diversification of the concept of the highest good also af-
fects the inner consistency of the doctrine and its centrality to Kant’s moral phi-
losophy. I think the debate between different interpreters is also amplified by their 
comprehension of the different conceptions of the highest good from different 
fields of Kant’s entire philosophical system.
The main purpose of the present paper is to identify the conception of the high-
est good that can best form a consistent doctrine and explain its necessity for 
Kant’s philosophical system. Besides the Introduction (I) and the Conclusion 
(VIII), the paper will consist of the following parts: (II) I will note that there are 
ambiguities within this concept in three different aspects according to Kant’s 
texts, and as a result we could logically form eight combinations of the concept; 
(III) I will summarize four possible interpretations of the necessity of the highest 
good in Kant’s philosophical system and their theoretical weaknesses according to 
academic texts;4 (IV) I will survey two ways of understanding the possibility of 
the highest good and their theoretical difficulties, respectively; (V) I will evaluate 
the given interpretations with the different combinations of conception, necessity, 
and possibility of the highest good according to the analysis in the first three parts 
and set out the criteria for a successful interpretation; (VI) I will point out that the 
 3 Many interpreters also mention this problem. For example, Beck and O’Connell are conscious of 
the difference between the juridical and maximal conceptions of the highest good (Lewis White 
Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press) 268; Eoin O’Connell, “Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good,” 
Kantian Review 17-2 (2012): 257), Silber, Auxter and Wike & Showler discuss the conceptions of 
the highest good as immanent and transcendent (John R. Silber, “Kant’s Conception of the Highest 
Good as Immanent and Transcendent,” The Philosophical Review 68-4 (1959): 469–492; Thomas 
Auxter, “The unimportance of Kant’s highest good,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 17-2 
(1979): 121–34; Victoria S. Wike and Ryan L. Showler, “Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good and 
the Archetype-Ectype Distinction,” Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2010): 521–33), Wood, Zeldin 
and Kleingeld distinguish the reference of the highest good to the individual from to a sociality 
(Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970) 93; Mary-
Barbara Zeldin, “The Summum Bonum, the Moral Law, and the Existence of God,” Kant-Studien 
62-1 (1971): 43–54; Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant on ‘Good’, the Good, and the Duty to Promote the 
Highest Good,” ed. Thomas Höwing, The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy (Berlin/Boston, 
MA: Walter de Gruyter, 2016) 34). All of the above distinctions are collected together by Yovel, 
Smith and Bader (Yirmiahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980) 30, 48n, 51–54; Steven G. Smith, “Worthiness to be Happy and Kant’s 
Concept of the Highest Good,” Kant-Studien 75 (1984): 173; Ralf M. Bader, “Kant’s Theory of the 
Highest Good,” ed. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader, The Highest Good in Aristotle and 
Kant (Corby: Oxford University Press, 2015) 188).
 4 Smith also enumerate four different understandings of the necessity of the highest good, but it 
seems that his last understanding of the highest good as justice could be reduced to his third 
understanding of the highest good as the content of the moral will Smith (1984): 168–90.
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sole possible successful interpretation of the necessity of the highest good is to 
interpret it as moral confirmation; (VII) Connected with the last part, I will sug-
gest that the only consistent conception of the highest good is to understand it as a 
transcendent, perfect, and communal concept. Under this interpretation, both 
religious-theological and secular-political dimensions have their necessary and 
specific functions to make the highest good possible, so that no parts of Kant’s 
philosophy should be seen as obsolete or redundant.
II. AMBIGUITY OF THE CONCEPT OF THE HIGHEST GOOD
A. The Concept of Justice and Perfection
The first ambiguity pertains to the intension of the highest good. If we only em-
phasize the “exact proportion” in the definition of the concept of the highest good, 
then the highest good only means “good for good, bad for bad,” and requires no 
flawless virtue and highest degree happiness. I would refer to this kind of highest 
good as a concept of justice. This understanding is not evident in general interpreta-
tions, but there are some suggestive passages in the original texts that might support 
such a reading. For instance, in the chapter “On the concept of an object of pure 
practical reason” in the second Critique, Kant uses the example of “someone who 
likes to vex and disturb peace-loving people finally gets a sound thrashing for one 
of his provocations” (KpV, 5: 61), and notes that everyone—even the individual 
concerned—will take this as good in itself in accordance with their reason. This 
description is an example of the highest good as a concept of justice, because, for 
Kant, the highest good is just the corresponding happiness to virtue “in the judg-
ment of an impartial reason” (KpV, 5: 110). In this scene, although the man has 
neither virtue nor happiness, he is diminished on account of him doing a bad thing. 
This situation still conforms to the exact proportion between virtue and happiness 
required by an impartial reason and to the primary definition of the highest good.
Another example appears in “The End of All Things”. In this work, Kant dis-
cusses the last day and the last judgment, after which the highest good should be 
accomplished in combination with the usual understanding of his doctrine of the 
highest good, which views it as “the beginning of the (blessed or cursed) eternity” 
(EaD, 8: 328). In the case of cursed eternity, this expression shows the possibility 
of a kind of highest good that contains neither virtue nor happiness, but only a 
proportion of their absence. Otherwise, Kant assesses two systems pertaining to 
this future eternity: “one is that of the unitists, awarding eternal blessedness to 
all human beings (after they have been purified by a longer or shorter penance), 
while the other is the system of the dualists, which awards blessedness to some 
who have been elected, but eternal damnation to all the rest” (EaD, 8: 328–329). 
Although Kant thinks that one cannot decide which one is theoretically true and 
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both systems have their own disadvantages, he still prefers the dualists for the 
practical aims since the unitistic system would easily weaken human beings’ 
moral striving (EaD, 8: 329). If we accept the dualistic system about the afterlife, 
the concept of justice of the highest good is the only way to conform to it.
However, it seems that most often Kant conceives of the highest good as a com-
bination of perfect virtue and highest degree happiness. For example, he describes 
the ideal highest good of God in the first Critique as “the morally most perfect 
will, combined with the highest blessedness” (A810/B838), while in the second 
Critique he describes the highest good of creatures as follows: “the greatest hap-
piness is represented as connected in the most exact proportion with the greatest 
degree of moral perfection (possible in creatures)” (KpV, 5: 129–130). I read this 
kind of highest good as a concept of perfection. According to this view, the high-
est good can no longer be “good for good, bad for bad,” and the aforementioned 
examples of the provocative man and of the last judgment can no longer be seen 
as the realization of the highest good.
B. The Concept of Individual and Community
The second ambiguity appears in the extensional object of the highest good. 
We know that Kant’s fundamental determination of the highest good is: “Virtue 
and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a person” 
(KpV, 5: 110). In this determination, in which Kant sees the bearer of the highest 
good as a person, it seems that the highest good can be said to be realized as long 
as the exact proportion between virtue and happiness happens to a person. In this 
sense, the pure practical reason commands people to promote their respective 
highest goods. Most uses of the concept of the highest good in the second Critique 
are, in this sense, for example, Stoic and Epicurean, which Kant compares to his 
own position, since they also concern the individual good. This kind of highest 
good I refer to as a concept of the individual.
On the contrary, when Kant contrasts the highest original good and the highest 
derived good, what he always contrasts with God (the highest original good) is not 
an individual, but an ideal world, like “an intelligible, i.e., moral world” (A811/
B839), “the best world” (KpV, 5:125). The detailed determination of this concept 
of the world can firstly be found in “On the Canon of Pure Reason” in the first 
Critique that the world as highest good consists in rational beings that benefit from 
each other because of their own morality (A809/B837). In this world, the mere pro-
portion between virtue and happiness in one person is no longer enough, since the 
task of promoting of the highest good, as Kant says in the third Critique, is the aim 
to combine universal happiness with “the most lawful morality of all rational be-
ings in this world” (KU, 5: 453). This means one should no longer only seek one’s 
own virtue and deserved happiness, but also seek the same for all other persons.
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Furthermore, if we consider Kant’s work from the later period, we can see in 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that this universal highest good 
consists not only in the simple fact that the universal happiness of everyone is 
in conformity with their morality, but also in a special constitution within them, 
namely an ethical community, which is “a universal republic based on the laws of 
virtue” (RGV, 6: 98). This thought shows that the highest good cannot be brought 
about yet, even when everyone strives for their moral perfection. The reason, 
which constitutes Kant’s focal point in the third part of Religion, is that one cannot 
get out of an ethical state of nature and achieve moral perfection alone. Instead, 
the help of others is necessary. Therefore, an individual’s mere striving for moral 
perfection is not enough, it lacks a way of organizing human beings into a commu-
nity. This would be a necessary way for them to complete their virtue and deserve 
their own happiness. For Kant, it is a specific duty that cannot be achieved by the 
power of an individual; it can only be realized by the power of the human species 
as a whole: “Now, here we have a duty sui generis, not of human beings toward 
human beings but of the human race toward itself” (RGV, 6: 97). We call this kind 
of common highest good a concept of community.
C. The Concept of Transcendent and Immanent
The final ambiguity emerges in the possibility of the realization of the highest 
good. In the second Critique, Kant clearly claims in many places that the highest 
good cannot be realized in this sensible world, but must be attained only in the 
afterlife, in an intelligible world. For example, in “The Immortality of the Soul as 
a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason,” Kant points out that the moral perfection of 
virtue, namely holiness, is impossible in our sensible life (KpV, 5: 122). In “The 
Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason,” Kant also points out 
that happiness (beatitude) in conformity with perfect morality likewise cannot be 
attained in this world (KpV, 5:129). In other words, the highest good is impossible 
in this sensible, empirical world; rather it is only possible in a supersensible world, 
as long as neither perfect morality nor the highest degree happiness is possible in 
the former. In this sense, the concept of the highest good is a transcendent concept.
Nevertheless, in the third Critique, notably Kant does not mention the afterlife 
so much and instead begins to articulate “the highest good in the world” (KU, 5: 
450). In combination with the teleology in the third Critique, it seems that there is 
continuity from the nature of this sensible world to the highest good as the final 
end of the same world, and thus the highest good should also be possible in this 
world. In addition, Kant also places the common highest good with the ethical 
community, discussed in Religion, under the title of “Philosophical representation 
of the victory of the good principle in the founding of a Kingdom of God on earth” 
(RGV, 6: 95). Similarly, this suggests that the highest good should be possible 
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on earth, in our empirical world. This kind of highest good can be defined as an 
immanent concept.
Summary
According to the aforementioned three pairs of ambiguities, occurring in three 
different dimensions, we can form eight logically possible concepts of the highest 
good with different conceptual implications. The possible combinations are as 
follows:
The highest good Justice Perfection
Individual + 
Immanent
The exact proportion between 
virtue and happiness of a person 
that can be realized in this 
sensible world
The highest degree happiness in 
conformity with the perfect virtue 
of a person that can be realized in 
this sensible world
Individual + 
Transcendent
The exact proportion between 
virtue and happiness of a person 
that can only be realized in a 
supersensible world
The highest degree happiness in 
conformity with the perfect virtue 
of a person that can only be real-
ized in a supersensible world
Communal + 
Immanent
The exact proportion between 
virtue and happiness of a com-
munity that can be realized in 
this sensible world
The highest degree happiness in 
conformity with the perfect virtue 
of a community that can be real-
ized in this sensible world
Communal + 
Transcendent
The exact proportion between 
virtue and happiness of a com-
munity that can only be realized 
in a supersensible world
The highest degree happiness in 
conformity with the perfect virtue 
of a community that can only be 
realized in a supersensible world
We can use this frame to undertake further analysis and to classify different in-
terpretations. In fact, the problem of ambiguity of the concept of the highest good 
cannot be solved in isolation. In order to answer this question, we should also 
consider why the doctrine of the highest good is necessary for Kant, and how the 
highest good can possibly be in conformity to his other philosophical doctrines. 
Once answers have been provided for these questions, we can then decide which 
concept of the highest good is more consistent with Kant’s philosophy as a whole.
III. THE NECESSITY OF THE HIGHEST GOOD
A. The Highest Good as the Interest of Reason as a Whole
This interpretation is based on the first Critique. In this work, Kant situates the 
concept of the highest good under the title of “On the ideal of the highest good, as 
a determining ground of the ultimate end of pure reason” (A804/B832) and sum-
marizes all interests of reason under three questions. The doctrine of the highest 
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good aims at the third question: “What may I hope?” This question can be seen 
as referring to the ultimate end of pure reason because it relates to theoretical and 
practical interests of pure reason and their conjunction at the same time, which 
already covers all uses of pure reason in the way that Kant thought at that time 
(A805/B833). The answer to this question is just the highest good as the propor-
tion between virtue and happiness, so that the request for the highest good as an 
object of hope is an a priori interest of pure reason according to its ultimate end, 
as long as it necessarily seeks the completeness and the unity of all its interests 
(A809/B837). According to this description, the request for the highest good does 
not depend on any moral requirement or relevant practical uses. It would be just a 
theoretical object that reason, after its fulfillment of the moral requirement, will 
hope to realize.
However, this interpretation would reduce the necessity of the highest good, 
since as an expected object it must not have a real possibility. It seems that there 
would also be no influence on Kant’s systems in the theoretical and practical 
fields, respectively, even if we do not consider this concept of the highest good. 
Taking these factors into account, this role does not conform to what Kant assigns 
to the highest good, namely that the moral law would be false once the highest 
good was impossible.
B. The Highest Good as Moral Incentive
This interpretation is also based primarily on the first Critique. In “On the 
ideal of the highest good, as a determining ground of the ultimate end of pure rea-
son,” Kant also claims that morality by itself cannot move us to perform its own 
requirements. Its ideas would just be “objects of approbation and admiration but 
not incentives for resolve and realization” (A813/B841), if the highest good as a 
whole end of pure reason were impossible. Only when the conditions (“a God and 
a world that is now not visible to us”) (ibid.) of the possibility of realization of the 
highest good are given will we have the incentive to perform our moral duties. In 
summary, these incentives are just the feelings of “promises and threats” (A811/
B839) brought about by the anticipation of “good for good, bad for bad,” which is 
just the realization of the proportion between virtue and happiness as the appro-
priate consequences, commanded by the moral law.
This doctrine conforms to Kant’s distinction between principium diiudicatio-
nis and principium executionis in his early lectures on ethics: “We first have to 
take up two points here: (1) the principle of appraisal of obligation, and (2) the 
principle of its performance or execution” (V-Mo/Collins, 27: 274). According 
to this distinction, the moral law is the principium diiudicationis that helps us to 
discern the duties, but it is not the principium executionis and cannot move us to 
perform said duties. By contrast, in order to perform our duties, we also need the 
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feelings, affected by the possibility of the highest good. In this sense, the possi-
bility of realization of the highest good is inevitable for Kant’s moral philosophy. 
Otherwise, morality would be merely a castle in the sky whose duties would be 
impossible to carry out.
However, it seems as if Kant has already given up this doctrine after his pub-
lication of the Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals in 1785. In his criti-
cal moral philosophy, the moral law alone can provide the incentive to perform 
actions and to ascribe them moral worth: “We have also shown above how neither 
fear nor inclination but simply respect for the law is that incentive which can give 
actions a moral worth” (GMS, 4: 440).
C. The Highest Good as Moral Duty
The interpretation of the highest good as a moral duty is mainly based on the 
second Critique. In “The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical 
Reason” and “On Assent from a Need of Pure Reason,” Kant repeatedly mentions 
that the promotion of the highest good is our duty: “Now, it was a duty for us to 
promote the highest good; hence, there is in us not merely the warrant but also the 
necessity, as a need connected with duty, to presuppose the possibility of this 
highest good” (KpV, 5: 125, cf. 126, 129, 142, 143 footnotes). This interpretation 
clearly draws out the close connection between the moral law and the highest 
good, while explaining why the moral law would be imaginary and false if the 
highest good were impossible: Because the moral law would fall into self-contra-
diction if it were to command something impossible. The validity of this connec-
tion is based on the so-called “Realizability principle” of “ought implies can”.5
There may be no controversy that Kant sees the highest good as a duty. 
However, this interpretation still faces four difficulties in respect of the whole 
doctrine of the highest good: (1) Kant does not explain how the duty to promote 
the highest good is derived from the formulas of the moral law, (2) even if we 
accept that we can derive a duty about the highest good from the moral law, this 
duty requires only “the promotion of the highest good,” not “the realization of the 
highest good.” According to the former, we need not presuppose the possibility 
of the highest good, but only the possibility of our ability in conformity with the 
maximization of human abilities in general, in order to execute this duty, (3) even 
if the realization of the highest good is a duty, there is still a problem insofar as 
 5 Wood has a clear exposition of this principle: “Now suppose there is an end that as a rational agent 
I am morally bound to set myself. In that case, I can neither rationally abandon this end nor ratio-
nally pursue it without believing that it is possible of attainment through the actions I take toward 
it. Under these circumstances, I have good reason, independently of any theoretical evidence, for 
holding the belief that my moral end is possible of attainment, and for holding any other belief to 
which this belief commits me” Wood (1970) 401.
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the concept of possibility here remains ambiguous. If only the logical possibility 
of the highest good were required for this duty, then the complete doctrine of the 
highest good cannot be established. Since the logical possibility of the highest 
good is only based on the principle of non-contradiction and is simply true, we do 
not need to postulate any further conditions of the highest good. Naturally, Kant 
is also aware of this difficulty and denies that the logical, contingent possibility of 
the highest good in the sensible world is sufficient for his doctrine: “A connection 
[between morality and happiness] which, in a nature that is merely an object of 
the senses, can never occur except contingently and cannot suffice for the highest 
good” (KpV, 5: 115). But there is still a problem as to whether the realizability 
principle implies a stronger possibility with the necessary causal relation between 
morality and happiness, and (4) even if this stronger sense of the possibility is 
assumed in the realizability principle, we can still doubt the reasons with which 
the postulates are bestowed on the duty of realizing the highest good in order to 
make it possible. The other normal duties cannot be necessarily realized in this 
sensible world either, but we do not set any postulates for them.
D. The Highest Good as Moral Confirmation
This interpretation is seldom noticed because it does not appear in Kant’s offi-
cially published works. Instead, it appears in his lecture on ethics: Moral 
Mrongovius II in 1784–5.6 In this lecture, Kant distinguishes the ground of motive 
(Bewegungsgrund) from the ground of confirmation (Bestätigungsgrund) of 
morality, when he talks about the moral reward. For him, the moral reward is not 
a ground of motive, but a ground of confirmation of the correctness and truth of 
the moral law.
The rewards do not have to be presented as ground of motive, otherwise this is merely a prudent 
behavior, but as ground of confirmation of the correctness and truth of the moral laws. Even the 
most virtuous, if he were in a world where he was unhappier, the more virtuous he would be, it 
would not be lacking in the ground of motive, but of confirmation. I usually do not know if my 
 6 These are student notes from one of Kant’s courses on ethics in the winter of 1784–85 at 
the University of Königsberg. They are supplied and edited by Krzysztof Celestyn Mrongowiusz 
at the age of 20. The importance of this course is that the manuscript of the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals was being prepared for publication at the same time. Therefore, these notes 
present many same theme of the Groundwork, like the good will, the categorical imperatives and 
autonomy, and can be seen as belonging to Kant’s mature moral philosophy in his critical period. 
Otherwise, they also refer to the themes of religion, the highest good, reward and punishment on 
that the Groundwork does not focus. These are directly related to our topic and thus worth to note. 
The more detailed informations about this work can be found in Jens Timmermann, “Mrongovius 
II: A Supplement to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” ed. Lara Denis and Oliver 
Sensen, Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018) 68–83.
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moral is a chimera (an ideal of the romancing imagination), if there would not be a reward; Thus, 
a great objection would be against the moral principles. We see the certainty of the principle 
as a priori, and we can confirm it from the consequences a posteriori. (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 637, 
translated by author)
Firstly, we can be sure that the concept of reward is just a concept of the highest 
good or at least its partial concept. Kant defines the reward as follows: “Reward is 
a physical good, which is awarded because of the moral good or for the reason that 
one is worthy of this good. It is the promotion of happiness, whereof the reason 
consists in the worthiness of the person” (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 635, translated by 
author). This definition is just a proportion between virtue and happiness, namely 
the concept of the highest good. Secondly, this description of the reward is just 
like that of the highest good in the second Critique, namely that one would doubt 
the moral law if it were impossible to fulfill. Thirdly, the reward must not be given 
a priori, but can be presented through experience.
According to the distinction between the ground of motive and the ground 
of confirmation, we can be sure that Kant does not hold that the reward and the 
highest good function as moral motivation; rather they can be understood in terms 
of the meaning of the ground of confirmation, which remains obscure. Perhaps 
we can better understand this concept through a comparison with Kant’s use of 
it in the theoretical cognition that even the reality of a priori cognition of nature 
that precedes all experience can also be confirmed by experience: “Here we are 
not concerned with such things [the hyperphysical objects] at all, but rather with 
that cognition of nature the reality of which can be confirmed through experience, 
even though such cognition is possible a priori and precedes all experience” (Pro, 
4: 296, cf. 329). Here, the point is made clear that pure theoretical cognition does 
not depend on experience, but experience can confirm the reality of theoretical 
cognition. We can think that pure theoretical cognitions provide the law of nature 
and thus determine the natural world, but they do not provide the contents that are 
determined by these laws. Without these contents, we cannot conceive the real 
world and the functions of the natural laws on it. Only experience gives us the real 
examples of the functions of the natural laws, and because of this we can confirm 
that the world is real and hence that the application of the natural laws on it are 
real too. This is what is meant by confirmation.
In comparison with pure theoretical cognitions, the moral law is much further 
from the empirical world. The objects that it determines directly are not in the 
phenomenal world, but in another world, namely an intelligible world. Hence, 
the validity of the moral law does not depend on the reward that is originally 
conceived in the phenomenal world as well. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see 
what relation exists between the moral law and the phenomenal world in which 
we actually live and act. If the moral law only relates to our intelligence, but not 
to the world and our concrete moral experiences in it, then as beings living in the 
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phenomenal world we cannot but doubt whether the phenomenal life is meaning-
less or whether this mere spiritual normativity is merely a delusion of our own 
mind. In this situation, if we believe in the highest good, the happiness that it 
requires can establish a relation between the moral and the phenomenal world 
and make the moral world no longer seem like a castle in the sky, because the 
happiness as a reward can be seen as a confirmation of moral worth through the 
sensible manner that a person, as a finite rational being, can better accept.
However, this interpretation faces some difficulties. Firstly, it comes up against 
a constraint. For if we accept the transcendent concept of the highest good, then 
the required happiness also happens in a supersensible world, and as a result, 
the moral law loses its connection to the phenomenal world again. Secondly, it 
remains obscure to what extent the doubt over the moral law, on account of its 
nonsensible character, is effective. Is it a priori? Is it anthropologically universal? 
Or does it only occur in certain individuals? The different answers relate to the 
different degrees of necessity of the highest good.
IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE HIGHEST GOOD
A. The Conditions of the Transcendent Highest Good
Already in the first Critique, Kant plainly points out that the highest good 
cannot be realized in the sensible world, thus its possibility can only consist in a 
supersensible world. In other words, this possibility in the supersensible world is 
guaranteed by God and the afterlife (A811/B839). In the second Critique, Kant 
explains in more detail the reasons for the highest good needing these two pre-
suppositions. The first element of the highest good is virtue, whose realization sits 
in complete agreement of the disposition with the moral law. However, this is a 
condition of moral perfection and holiness that no sensible being can ever attain; 
at best they can constantly make progress toward this aim, and as such the reali-
zation of this perfect state can only be conceived in an infinite progression of life, 
that is to say, via the immortality of the soul (KpV, 5: 122). Thus, the immortality 
of the soul is the first condition of the possibility of the highest good.
Concerning the second element of the highest good, namely happiness, Kant 
thinks that only the presupposition of existence of God can guarantee the required 
happiness, because only an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent and eternal 
author of the world can fairly evaluate the human dispositions and always distrib-
ute the corresponding happiness according to their virtues. Therefore, the highest 
good can only be possible in a moral world governed by God (KpV, 5: 128). Thus, 
the existence of God is the second condition of possibility of the highest good.
However, there are still some difficulties and constraints in deploying these 
two postulates to guarantee the possibility of the highest good in relation to its 
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ambiguities and necessity: (1) The postulate of the immortality of the soul is nec-
essary because it makes a morally endless progression of possible life. However, 
the progression presupposes the alteration in time and the time belongs to the 
form of sensible intuition in Kant’s system, which seems to be contradictory in 
respect of conceiving an alteration in a supersensible world, (2) it seems that the 
immortality of the soul is only necessary for the perfect concept of the high-
est good. If the highest good is merely a concept of justice, this means that the 
realization of the highest good consists only in the proportion between virtue and 
happiness according to the concept of justice, but does not require perfect virtue 
and the highest degree happiness. Certain rewards and punishments after the last 
judgment in conformity with the given virtues of everyone is already enough for 
this realization and one need no longer assume an infinite progression of moral 
life, (3) the existence of God is necessary for the highest good not only as a con-
cept of justice, but also as a concept of perfection. Moreover, not only individual 
happiness but also the happiness of the whole community must depend on Him. 
Nevertheless, such happiness, guaranteed by God in a supersensible world, seems 
to contradict Kant’s usual definition of the concept of happiness. The basic deter-
mination of happiness, for Kant, is “that all inclinations unite in one sum” (GMS, 
4: 399), and the inclination means: “The dependence of the faculty of desire upon 
feelings” (GMS, 4: 414 footnote). According to this view, the content of happiness 
is based on the empirical inclinations and thus essentially belongs to the sensible 
world, even though this concept by itself might not be an empirical one. In this 
sense, to claim that there is a supersensible happiness seems to be something of 
a paradox. But Kant simply claims that God guarantees the required happiness 
in a supersensible world. Perhaps he is also conscious of this question, because 
sometimes he uses the concept of beatitude instead of happiness. Does this mean 
that there is a sui generis happiness, which is essentially different from happiness 
in the sensible world? What is its precise determination? Is it compatible with 
human nature? All these questions have to be answered in order to establish the 
possibility of the transcendent highest good, and (4) as mentioned in the previous 
section, if the highest good only has a transcendent possibility, then it is obvious 
that it cannot function as moral confirmation. This is so because the core of this 
function is to convince us that the moral law has a relation to our concrete life in 
the sensible world, to avoid the doubt that the moral law is merely a delusion of our 
own making. However, since the transcendent highest good can only be realized 
in an afterlife, we cannot see its relation with this world at all.
B. The Conditions of the Immanent Highest Good
Kant plainly claims in many places in the first and second Critiques that the 
highest good can only be realized in the afterlife. Nevertheless, even in these same 
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works, there are hints of the realization of the highest good also relating to the 
nature of this world. For example, in the first Critique Kant mentions that the hope 
of the highest good still relates to nature, only it must have the highest reason as 
its cause (A810/B838). In the second Critique, Kant’s description of God as the 
condition of the possibility of the highest good also relates to the aspect of nature 
(KpV, 5: 125). In these examples, God as the required condition of the possibility 
of the highest good is described as the cause of nature, implying an immanent 
concept of the highest good so that God arranges the connection between virtue 
and happiness through the nature of this world. This is because nature belongs to 
the sensible world and the highest good should have nothing to do with the state 
of nature, if it can only be realized in a supersensible world.
It is possible that these examples still do not provide strong evidence since Kant 
also mentions the connection between nature and morals in “a kingdom of God” 
(KpV, 5: 158). This implies that the expression of nature does not necessarily 
refer to a sensible world, although it is difficult to understand to what exactly a 
supersensible nature might refer. In any case, there are still other descriptions of 
the highest good that more concretely support the possibility of it obtaining in this 
world. For example, Kant mentions in the first Critique that the same sensible, 
natural world under the control of God can at the same time be seen as an intelli-
gible, moral one, as arising out of the idea of the highest good (A815-6/B843-4). 
In the second Critique, he also points to the possibility that the corresponding 
happiness as an effect in the sensible world results from the morality of disposi-
tion as an intellectual cause (KpV, 5: 114–115). Both of these examples describe 
the possibility of the realization of the highest good in this sensible world.
We can find the more apparent tendency of the immanent understanding of 
the highest good in the third Critique that the sensible world can have the purpo-
siveness of nature through the principle of the reflective power of judgment. This 
purposiveness of nature should further be determined by a moral ultimate purpose 
that is only possible under a moral theology. This course shows the procedure by 
which a person develops her understanding of this world from a sensible to an 
intelligible one and finally infers from it the possibility of the immanent highest 
good. It is also remarkable that Kant hardly mentions the afterlife in the third 
Critique.
However, the purposiveness of nature and the moral theology in the third 
Critique are still incapable of setting out the concrete procedure of the generation 
of harmony between nature and morality, and since their inconsistency, at present, 
is a fact, we can only believe that it will happen in the future. It is also hard to 
explain how the deserved happiness of mortal human beings can be distributed 
in time. Thus, the immanent possibility of the highest good is not unproblematic 
either.
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V. THE EVALUATION OF THE GIVEN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF THE HIGHEST GOOD ACCORDING TO ITS CONCEPT, 
NECESSITY, AND POSSIBILITY
Let us now survey the available interpretations according to the previous clas-
sification of the different concepts and understandings of the highest good. 
Regarding the first ambiguity, despite some interpreters mentioning the distinc-
tion between the just concept and the perfect concept of the highest good, almost 
no one sees the concept of justice as what Kant really had in mind or sought to 
thematize in his system theoretically.7 This might be because reason always seeks 
perfection and perfection already implies justice. Hence, if there were the perfect 
highest good, then there would also be no problem of injustice.
In combination with the second and third ambiguities, most interpreters under-
stand the highest good as the connection between an individual’s flawless virtue 
and highest degree happiness that can only be realized in a supersensible world, 
whether she is for or against the doctrine of the highest good. This is the classic 
interpretation according to the second Critique. The debate over this interpreta-
tion is whether this highest good conflicts with the moral autonomy and whether 
it can be realized. Critics of the doctrine of the highest good basically adopt a 
negative stance toward these questions and only acknowledge the meaning of the 
highest good as the interest of reason.8 By contrast, defenders of the doctrine 
mostly explain the necessity of the highest good through its connection to the 
moral law and duty.9
Considering the other combinations, no interpreters that see the highest good 
as being realized through a community would interpret it as a transcendent con-
cept. The meaning of the highest good as a concept of community can only be 
 7 Stephen Engstrom, “The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral Theory,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 52-4 (1992): 764–5, Beiser (2006) 599, Thomas Wyrwich, “From 
Gratification to Justice. The Tension between Anthropology and Pure Practical Reason in Kant’s 
Conception(s) of the Highest Good,” Kant Yearbook 3 (2011): 91–106 and O’Connell (2012): 
257–79 are few interpreters that emphasize the highest good should be a concept of justice.
 8 For example Beck (1960) 244–5, Jeffrie Murphy, “The Highest Good as Content of Kant’s Ethical 
Formalism,” Kant-Studien 56-1 (1965): 102–10 and Auxter (1979): 121–34.
 9 For example Klaus Düsing, “Das Problem Des höchsten gutes in Kants praktischer Philosophie,” 
Kant-Studien 63 (1971): 5–42, Zeldin (1971): 43–54, Linus Hauser, “Praktische Anschauung als 
Grundlage der Theorie vom höchsten Gut bei Kant,” Kant-Studien 75-2 (1984): 228–36, Jacqueline 
Mariña, “Making Sense of Kant’s Highest Good,” Kant-Studien 91-3 (2000): 329–55, Marc 
Zobrist, “Kants Lehre vom höchsten Gut und die Frage moralischer Motivation,” Kant-Studien 
99-3 (2008): 285–311, Courtney Fugate, “The Highest Good and Kant’s Proof(s) of God’s 
Existence,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2014): 137–58 and Florian Marwede, “Kant on 
Happiness and the Duty to Promote the Highest Good,” ed. Thomas Höwing, The Highest Good in 
Kant’s Philosophy (Berlin/Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter, 2016) 51–69.
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realized through cooperation of the striving of all human beings. If there is a God 
that guarantees this realization in a supersensible world, then the function of the 
community would be meaningless and this concept of the highest good would be 
violated.
The other possibilities entail understanding the highest good as an imma-
nent concept. There are two approaches in this respect. One begins with the 
aspect of the individual and reduces the requirement of the highest good as a 
duty, so that the realization of the highest good no longer means the most 
exact proportion between virtue and happiness in their highest degree; instead 
it is only the result of the highest degree of striving within one’s power. In this 
reading, the transcendent concept of the highest good is often only retained in 
a weak sense, serving a purely regulative function, but as such it does not 
maintain an immanent understanding in the strict sense.10 The other approach 
comprises the authentic immanent understanding that focuses on the com-
monality of the highest good. This view does not see the highest good in terms 
of individual duty, but rather as the duty of the entire human species, and it 
tries to guarantee its possibility through an ideal social and political constitu-
tion of the human.11
 10 For example Silber (1959) 469–92, “The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest Good as the 
Canon of Pure Reason in Kant’s Philosophy,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 1 
(1959/60): 233–44, “The Copernican Revolution in Ethics: The Good Reexamined,” Kant-Studien 
51 (1960): 85–101, “The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant’s Ethics,” Ethics 73-3 (1963): 
179–97, “Der Schematismus der praktischen Vernunft,” Kant-Studien 56 (1965) 253–73, 
“Procedural Formalism in Kant’s Ethics,” Review of Metaphysics 28-2 (1974): 197–236, John 
Beversluis, “Kant on Moral Striving,” Kant-Studien 65 (1974): 67–77, Mariña (2000): 329–55 and 
Wike and Showler (2010): 521–33.
 11 For example Gerald W. Barnes, “In Defense of Kant’s Doctrine of the Highest Good,” Philosophical 
Forum 2–4 (1971): 446–58, Yovel (1980) 72, Sharon Anderson-Gold, “Kant’s Ethical 
Commonwealth: The Highest Good as a Social Good,” International Philosophical Quarterly 
26-1 (1986): 23–32, “God and Community: An Inquiry into the Religious Implications of the 
Highest Good,” ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered 
(Indianapolis, IN: Indiana, 1991) 113–31, Gerhard Krämling, “Das höchste Gut als mögliche Welt. 
Zum Zusammenhang von Kulturphilosophie und systematischer Architektonik bei I. Kant,” Kant-
Studien 77 (1986): 273–88, Andrew Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 26-4 (1988): 593–619, “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant’s 
Principle of Happiness,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70-1 (1989): 42–72, Engstrom (1992): 
776–8, Paul Guyer, Kant on freedom, law, and happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), “Kantian Communities. The Realm of Ends, the Ethical Community, and the Highest 
Good,” ed. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe, Kant and the Concept of Community (Rochester, 
NY: Boydell & Brewer Group Ltd., 2011) 88–120, Kleingeld (2016) 33–49 and David Sussman, 
“The Highest Good Who Needs It?” ed. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader, The Highest 
Good in Aristotle and Kant (Corby: Oxford University Press, 2015) 215–28.
THE AMBIGUITY OF KANT’S CONCEPT OF THE HIGHEST GOOD
371
Regarding the necessity of the highest good, we have seen that the critics at 
best see the highest good as merely the status of the interest of reason, while most 
defenders understand the highest good as a moral duty. Most also agree that one 
can no longer interpret the highest good as a moral incentive after 1785, at which 
point Kant had established his mature critical ethics. There are still some people 
who understand the highest good as a moral incentive, but their reason is that it is 
a moral end required by the moral law. In this sense, because the moral law by 
itself is the moral incentive, its end can naturally also be understood as the incen-
tive. Hence, this interpretation is not far from the interpretation of the highest good 
as moral duty.12 Lastly, there are only a few people who base the necessity of the 
highest good on more concrete moral experience rather than moral duty, and they 
can be seen as holding the interpretation of the highest good as moral 
confirmation.13
According to the foregoing analysis, most defenders of the doctrine of the high-
est good view the highest good through the lens of moral duty, with the chief dif-
ference being whether their concept is transcendent individual, immanent 
individual, or immanent communal. In my opinion, firstly, these different con-
cepts of the highest good as moral duty are not freed from the difficulty of their 
conceptual contradiction within the whole doctrine: the transcendent individual 
highest good still confronts the conceptual contradiction of supersensible happi-
ness;14 the immanent individual highest good gives up the possibility of its genu-
ine concept; the immanent communal highest good cannot guarantee its realization 
through human activity in the sensible world. Secondly, they all confuse the two 
senses of the possibility. The possibility required by duty only refers to a logical 
possibility or at best a high probability resulting from the moral action, but the 
 12 For example Zeldin (1971): 43–54, Mariña (2000): 329–55, Lara Denis, “Autonomy and the 
Highest Good,” Kantian Review 10 (2005): 33–59, Zobrist (2008): 285–311 and Fugate (2014): 
137–58.
 13 For example Wood (1970) 8, 155, Yovel (1980) 40, 65 and 72, Smith (1984): 168–90, R. Z. 
Friedman, “The Importance and Function of Kant’s Highest Good,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 22-3 (1984): 325–42, “Hypocrisy and the Highest Good: Hegel on Kant’s Transition 
from Morality to Religion,” Journal of the History of Philosophy0 24-4 (1986): 503–22, Matthew 
Caswell, “Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good, the Gesinnung, and the Theory of Radical 
Evil,” Kant-Studien 97-2 (2006): 184–209, Sussman (2015) 215–28, Andrea Marlen Esser, 
“Applying the Concept of the Good: The Final End and the Highest Good in Kant’s Third Critique,” 
ed. Thomas Höwing, The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy (Berlin/Boston, MA: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2016) 245–62 and Gabriele Tomasi, “God, the Highest Good, and the Rationality of 
Faith: Reflections on Kant’s Moral Proof of the Existence of God,” ed. Thomas Höwing, The 
Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy (Berlin/Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter, 2016) 124.
 14 Hence Walter suggests a special kind of happiness based on the satisfaction of the higher faculty 
of desire instead of the normal sensible happiness for the highest good. See Walter Brugger S.J., 
“Kant und das höchste Gut,” Kant-Studien 18-1 (1964): 50–61.
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doctrine of the highest good requires a possibility with the necessary guarantee. 
The former does not need necessary realization of the highest good by itself, 
whereas the latter requires that it can be realized by certain causes and mecha-
nisms. Only the latter can establish the complete doctrine of the highest good that 
includes the practical postulates and the moral theology, but it cannot be grounded 
in the interpretation of the highest good as moral duty.
Regarding the interpretation of the highest good as the moral confirmation, 
while it has a certain degree of persuasiveness, it lacks sufficient support within 
Kant’s published works. Furthermore, its most substantial difficulty is that it is 
still hard to explain this approach in terms of the relation between the highest 
good and the moral law, namely what influence of the acceptability of the moral 
law it would result in if the highest good were not possible.
To sum up, the highest good as moral duty cannot further prove the necessity 
of its realization, whereas the highest good as moral confirmation cannot con-
nect the highest good to the moral law. This forms a dilemma: “Either we accept 
the interpretation of the highest good as the mere moral duty, then the necessity 
of the highest good cannot be established, or we adopt the interpretation of the 
highest good as the moral confirmation, in which case the highest good loses its 
connection with the moral law.” In relation to the possibility of the highest good, 
we confront another dilemma: “Either we take the transcendent concept of the 
highest good, meaning that this concept falls into contradiction, or we understand 
the highest good as immanent, in which case its possibility is hardly able to be 
accomplished.” Solving these twin dilemmas is the primary task that confronts all 
defenders of the doctrine of the highest good.
Faced with these dilemmas, I think it is worthwhile trying an approach that 
no one has managed to develop thus far. I suggest that the highest good should be 
understood as a moral confirmation and a perfect, communal, transcendent con-
cept. In part 5, I will argue why it is necessary to interpret the highest good as 
moral confirmation and set out the relation between the highest good and the 
moral law. In part 6, I will explain how a perfect, communal, transcendent concept 
of the highest good can fulfill the various requirements of the whole doctrine of 
the highest good, as well as demonstrate that this understanding does not eradicate 
its contrary concepts in the ambiguities, but rather synthesizes them under itself.
VI. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE HIGHEST GOOD AS MORAL 
CONFIRMATION
Firstly, we should distinguish the possibility required by a duty from the possi-
bility needed by the complete doctrine of the highest good. The former is weaker 
than the latter. We can begin to conceive the former possibility with the normal 
duty. For example, if we encounter a traffic accident and have a duty to save the 
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wounded from death, we do not need to assume that our actions will always suc-
cessfully attain this end through a certain mechanism in order to carry out our 
duty. Here, the possibility according to the realizability principle only demands 
that the causal connection between our actions and the results, required by duty, 
is not impossible,15 namely there is a probability of the attainment of the end to a 
certain degree.
Applying this to the highest good as moral duty, this duty likewise only 
requires a certain probability of the realization of the highest good to which our 
actions can contribute. However, this kind of possibility is not enough for the 
complete doctrine of the highest good with the practical postulates and the moral 
theology, because all of our moral actions can already bring about this probability, 
so that we no longer need God or the afterlife in order to fulfill this duty. In this 
sense, the interpretation of the highest good as moral duty does not essentially 
depart from the domain of the theory of moral duty; in doing so, it makes the 
highest good not so different from the normal duties and thus renders redundant 
Kant’s special arrangement of the doctrine of the highest good.
By contrast, the possibility, needed by the complete doctrine of the highest 
good, implies a necessary mechanism that guarantees the causal relation of the 
moral actions and the reality of its end. Only the requirement of this strong possi-
bility needs the postulates of an afterlife and God as this mechanism, the connec-
tion of morality and religion, and we can only find the ground of this possibility 
in the interpretation of the highest good as moral confirmation, which essentially 
differs from the theory of moral duty. It provides this possibility according to 
moral experience rather than moral duty.
I assume that the need of the moral confirmation and its relation to the moral 
law arise out of the character of the moral law insofar as it is totally independent 
of experience and cannot be deduced from a higher premise, just as Kant explains 
its objective validity only through an unprovable “fact of the reason” (KpV, 5: 31). 
 15 Willaschek’s weakening of the realizability principle is insightful and helpful for us to get this 
point: “RP5: An agent A is rational in trying to realize some end E by doing D only if A (rationally) 
does not believe it to be impossible that (i) A’s doing D should causally contribute to realizing E 
and that (ii) a set of causal conditions that are jointly sufficient to realize E (of which A’s doing D 
is a part) obtains” (Marcus Willaschek, “Must We Believe in the Realizability of Our Ends? On a 
Premise of Kant’s Argument for the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason,” ed. Thomas Höwing, 
The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy (Berlin/Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter, 2016) 239). 
However, he still insists that even through this weakened principle, the argument for the necessity 
of the highest good based on the moral duty is still valid because he believes that the antinomy of 
practical reason exactly proves the impossibility of highest good and thus practical postulates are 
necessary to solve this antinomy. But I think that the antinomy of practical reason only denies the 
realization of highest good through necessary mechanisms. This does not mean the highest good 
is impossible in a strict sense.
CHENG-HAO LIN
374
This is too abstract and hardly accepted by human beings who have the double 
character of the sensible and the intelligible world simultaneously. Kant believes 
that the moral law is already rooted in common human reason, but it still difficult 
to grasp the purity of the moral law in the reflective sense. For Kant, this is the 
task of philosophy.
In the first section of the Groundwork, where Kant derives the pure moral law 
from the common rational moral cognition, he claims: “Despite all the agreement 
even of common understanding with this idea [the absolute worth of a mere will], 
a suspicion must yet arise that its covert basis is perhaps mere high-flown fantasy 
and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason to 
our will as its governor” (GMS, 4: 394). This unstable ground with the addition of 
the conflict between human sensible needs and inclinations and the purity of the 
moral law will easily result in the so-called natural dialectic (GMS, 4: 405). This 
resort to human nature creates a major incentive to surrender the validity, purity 
or strictness of the moral law and to make the duties more suitable to subjective 
inclinations.
Kant believes that this natural dialectic can be eliminated only by “a complete 
critique of the reason” (ibid.), as he settles the dialectic in the field of theoretical 
philosophy. According to the structure of Kant’s critical philosophy in general, I 
think the natural dialectic is not dissolved in Kant’s theory of moral duty in the 
Groundwork but in the second Critique, which includes a complete critique with 
a doctrine of dialectic. As such, it is just a doctrine of the highest good. If this 
understanding is correct, then the dissolution of the natural dialectic needs the 
possibility of realization of the highest good. If the realization of the highest good 
is possible, then the conflict between the moral law and the sensible world with 
sensible needs and inclinations would be reconciled and the danger of the natural 
dialectic would be diminished.
However, this interpretation of the highest good as moral confirmation, or as 
the resolution of the natural dialectic, still has to answer two concrete questions: 
(1) Does the natural dialectic happen in everyone’s moral life and thus have uni-
versal meaning? (2) How does the possibility of the realization of the highest 
good concretely overcome the natural dialectic? In fact, this departure of human 
disposition from the moral law, caused by the natural dialectic, is not a contingent 
phenomenon that only appears in certain people if we connect it to the concept of 
radical evil in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. For Kant, 
radical evil is universally bestowed on every human and named “the propensity 
to evil in human nature” (RGV, 6: 28). There are three different grades of this 
propensity to evil: (1) the frailty, (2) the impurity, and (3) the depravity of human 
nature or of the human heart (RGV, 6: 29).
The three situations are all based on the fact that a human is a sensible being 
and “to pursue the happiness” is the individual’s most significant unmoral 
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incentive. Thus all evils arise from the conflict between the moral incentive and 
this unmoral incentive, namely the conflict between the commitment “to obey the 
moral law” and “to pursue the happiness.” The frailty means that the incentive 
“to pursue the happiness” defeats the incentive “to obey the moral law” in the 
subjective maxim, although the moral law is still the highest principle of judging 
an action. The impurity consists in that one undertakes moral actions not simply 
out of “respect for the law” but also as part of one’s pursuit of “happiness.” The 
depravity is that one accepts the commitment “to pursue happiness” as the highest 
principle of the action, and in this sense it instantiates radical evil by giving up the 
moral law as the highest maxim of the disposition. All of these propensities to evil 
correspond to the description of the natural dialectic set out in the Groundwork: 
“But from this there arises a natural dialectic, that is, a propensity to rationalize 
against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least 
upon their purity and strictness, and, where possible, to make them better suited 
to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and to destroy 
all their dignity” (GMS, 4:405). Through this connection, we can confirm that the 
natural dialectic is just the propensity to evil in Religion that is indeed rooted in 
human nature and has universality in the human species. So far, we have already 
answered the first question.
In relation to the second question, although radical evil, arising from the na-
ture dialectic, is indigenously bestowed on all human beings, this does not mean 
that it is irreversible and insurmountable, or else striving toward the good would 
also be impossible and the moral law would be totally meaningless. After all, the 
occurrence of the nature dialectic consists in the fact that though the moral duty 
also requires humans to pursue their own and other people’s happiness, the limita-
tions of nature often prevent them from realizing this end or even create conditions 
in which the carrying out of moral actions actually damages human happiness. 
This causes people to continually struggle between two conflicting incentives that 
bring about different results, and to find many excuses and sophistries to prove 
the priority of the unmoral incentive over the moral one, and finally even to accept 
this priority as a basic principle of action.
Kant does not explicitly spell out these excuses and sophistries, but we can 
conceive one of them by way of the necessity of Kant’s system: The realization of 
the moral end cannot be guaranteed in the objective world. This suggests that the 
objective world has no relation to morality. Therefore, if a human—as a member 
of this world—still assigns the moral dimension to herself, it is a fantasy. This 
excuse is based on a presupposition of the teleology of the world, that everything 
in the world has its use to a final end. Thus, if the world has nothing to do with 
an end and nothing can have an effect on it, then this end would probably be false 
and should be seen as a fantasy according to the teleological principle. That is, this 
would just be a case of the moral law, if the highest good were impossible. The 
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conflict between this teleological principle and the moral law is not an empirical 
and contingent one; rather it is an a priori and necessary one because the teleolog-
ical principle is also based on reason, in concreto, the function of the reflective 
power of judgment. Therefore, this conflict is also a conflict of reason with itself, 
and the nature dialectic has thus an a priori excuse in reason.
However, if people believe that the highest good will finally be realized 
(although not at the moment of their actions), then, firstly, the conflict between the 
moral law and human needs and inclinations is no longer an essential one, because 
in this situation the human will hope that the happiness is the natural result of the 
execution of the moral duty, and thus the temptation to seek an excuse will be 
considerably reduced and potentially overcome. Secondly, through the possibility 
of the highest good, the person will believe that the objective world will react to 
the moral action and the moral end will be guaranteed in it. This means that the 
conflict between the moral law and the teleological principle will be solved and 
can no longer be an a priori excuse to justify doubting the moral law. It is just a 
doctrine of the highest good that can give us the theoretical resources to resist 
the sophistry of the natural dialectic, through the complete critical reflection that 
can lead us from radical evil and to return to the way of striving for good once 
again. This totally conforms to the task Kant assigns moral philosophy in the 
Groundwork:
In this way, common human reason is impelled, not by some need of speculation (which never 
touches it as long as it is content to be mere sound reason), but on practical grounds themselves, to 
go out of its sphere and to take a step into the field of practical philosophy, in order to obtain there 
information and distinct instruction regarding the source of its principle and the correct determi-
nation of this principle in comparison with maxims based on need and inclination, so that it may 
escape from its predicament about claims from both sides and not run the risk of being deprived 
of all genuine moral principles through the ambiguity into which it easily falls. (GMS, 4: 405)
To sum up in more everyday language, the moral life is a natural, healthy state of 
the human being, but the conflict between duty and inclination makes us fall into 
reflections on morality. This is whence the risk of thoroughly giving up the moral 
requirements arises: It would arise through various sophistries based on the a 
priori structure of human nature. In this case, the task of philosophy (for Kant, its 
ultimate form should be the critique of the rational faculties) is just to give a the-
ory in the thought that can resist various sophistries. All of this leads us to think 
correctly and helps us to free ourselves from the seduction of the nature dialectic.
At last, we should be clear that the acceptance of the doctrine of the highest 
good is not identified with the total elimination of evil; rather this doctrine only 
helps us to overcome radical evil in the strict sense, namely the depravity of the 
human heart that accepts self-love as the highest principle of action. However, 
humans will still carry out evil acts because of the frailty or the impurity of the 
heart. Nevertheless, through this Reformation of the thought, we can say that one 
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is already on the way toward the good, as Kant says: “Who incorporates this 
purity into his maxims, though on this account still not holy as such (for between 
maxim and deed there still is a wide gap), is nonetheless upon the road of endless 
progress toward holiness” (RGV, 6: 46–47). Purity here means the overcoming 
of the depravity that one merely accepts “to obey the moral law” as the highest 
principle of action.
In addition, introducing the highest good to overcome radical evil is not iden-
tified with the impurity of the human heart that mixes happiness in the incentive 
in order to execute moral actions. Firstly, happiness in the highest good is limited 
under the condition of the moral law. Secondly, the impurity of the heart still 
happens under the moral law as the highest principle of action, but the belief of 
the highest good is simply there to eliminate the sophistry that distorts the moral 
law and its commands into a fantasy. In this situation, there is no longer any moral 
incentive. As such, perhaps we can think of the highest good as a meta-moral 
incentive, whose function is not to directly move us to execute certain duties, but 
rather to help us to maintain a correct moral worldview. The former is only pos-
sible under the latter. In connection with the nature dialectic and the theory of 
radical evil, the doctrine of the highest good obtains its complete meaning. It is 
important for everyone because of the universality of radical evil, and it has a close 
connection to the moral law in the sense that it can reform radical evil and prevent 
the human heart from the sophistry that denies the reality of the moral law.
VII. THE TRANSCENDENT, PERFECT, AND COMMUNAL HIGHEST 
GOOD
A. The Transcendent Concept of the Highest Good
The reasons to adopt the transcendent concept of the highest good are: (1) It 
is impossible to imagine that the immanent highest good will be realized merely 
through natural mechanisms or human actions alone, and (2) Even if it will be 
eventually realized, it can only happen in an infinitely far-off future and as such 
is meaningless for the current generation of human beings. If there were no af-
terlife and no God, the highest good would be impossible, at least for the defunct 
persons. However, as noted, the difficulty of the transcendental understanding 
of the highest good is that supersensible happiness is incomprehensible; thus 
its transcendental concept should also not be understood as usual. If, to Kant’s 
mind, Christianity provides a better concept of the highest good than Stoicism 
and Epicureanism (KpV, 5: 127), then its understanding of the afterlife should be 
helpful in enhancing the transcendent concept of the highest good.
In fact, Christianity’s kingdom of God is not a pure, supersensible world. It is 
not a paradise with no sensible character and into which human beings will enter 
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directly upon death; rather it means that the trial of God has come to this world. 
In this time, all the defunct persons will be reincarnated in the same earth and 
judged: “The sea gave up the dead that was in it, and death and Hades gave up 
the dead that was in them, and each person was judged according to what they 
had done” (Revelation, 20:13). Thus, the supersensible world here is not identified 
with a nonsensible world.
Moreover, Kant deploys his description of the last day via the last judgment in 
his “The End of All Things”, but this is not literally the last day: “judgment day 
would obviously not be the last day; instead, different days would follow upon it, 
one after another” (EaD, 8: 328). Instead it is just the entire transformation of the 
present world. Kant thinks that the Christian last day is not a jump across a gap 
with the incommunicability from the sensible to a nonsensible world, but rather 
the alteration of the state of the same world along a continuous timeline.16
At the same time, Kant thinks that the idea of the last day derives from the 
moral course of things in the world. It should relate to an eternal supersensible 
world, but should also be made sensible, in order to be comprehensible (ibid.). 
Kant does not clearly explain the relative importance of this “making sensible” 
within his moral philosophy, but he does point out that this is the only way to 
comprehend the supersensible world. I think it is necessary for people through 
this “making sensible” to conceive the possibility of the highest good in order to 
solve the contradiction of the concept of supersensible happiness. Hence, we can 
say that the “making sensible” of the supersensible world is not a theoretically 
cognitive means; rather it is necessary for practical faith.
According to this “making sensible” understanding of the supersensible world, 
the transcendent concept of the highest good can be so understood as a sensible 
world that is reformed by God. In this case, the afterlife will not be located in an-
other world, but only in the future world. The afterlife, in this understanding, can-
not only occur through God’s power to overcome the natural limitations against 
human happiness in the world, covering all human beings from the ancient past 
to the distant future; it can also make supersensible happiness comprehensible 
because the human being still remains a sensible character in the afterlife. In this 
sense, a proper concept of the highest good that can truly be realized must be a 
transcendent concept that contains a special immanent concept at the same time.
 16 Beiser also mentions this point: “For it is central to Augustine’s theory that the city of God does 
not exist in heaven, in some supernatural realm beyond the earth; rather, it exists on the earth and 
in this world; but on the earth and in this world insofar as it is completely transformed by the sec-
ond coming of Christ” Beiser (2006) 599.
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B. The Perfect Concept of the Highest Good
However, the previous Christian highest good is a transcendent, individual, just 
concept of the highest good whereby God contributes to the personal proportion 
between virtue and happiness directly. Nevertheless, the concept of justice will set 
a limitation on human moral striving because even if the defunct persons will be 
resurrected on the last day, God will give his judgment of everyone according to 
the grade of virtue during one’s lifetime and send them into the blessed or cursed 
eternity. This means that there is no more room for people to pursue moral perfec-
tion. In respect of the differences between people’s lifetimes—meaning that the 
time given to each person to pursue the end of moral perfection varies—it is not a 
particularly just or fair arrangement whereby a sole judgment at the beginning of 
the afterlife decides whether one should fall into blessed or cursed eternity.
We have seen that Kant offers two different conceptions of the afterlife in “The 
End of All Things”: the unitistic and dualistic systems. According to our classifi-
cation, the unitist holds the transcendent perfect highest good, whereas the dualist 
holds the transcendent just highest good. Kant himself does not appreciate the 
unististic system and thinks that it weakens the moral law; instead he prefers the 
dualistic system because of its provision of moral caution. However, according 
to the requirement of justice, I think the unitistic system is more reasonable. In 
fact, Kant also recognizes the problem of the injustice of the dualistic system 
(EaD, 8: 329–330). After all, everyone’s qualities of temperament, the environ-
ment of growing up, and contingent encounters with people and events are dif-
ferent. Therefore, everyone has different degrees of moral obstacles to overcome 
in their lifetime. In this light, it does not conform to the principle of justice and 
fairness, if one’s moral worth and deserved happiness are only evaluated in the 
afterlife according to one’s merit during one’s lifetime. Therefore, considering 
the inequality of everyone’s potential for moral striving and the varying extent of 
moral obstacles in this world, a more reasonable concept of the highest good is a 
perfect one. According to the transcendent perfect highest good, everyone can, in 
the afterlife, according to their merit in a lifetime, through the long or short moral 
striving, finally attain the same moral perfection and the corresponding beatitude. 
This analysis demonstrates that the transcendent perfect highest good is a more 
proper concept because it has covered justice in itself.
C. The Communal Concept of the Highest Good
Furthermore, regarding the ambiguity between the individual and the com-
munal understandings, if we understand the highest good only through the tran-
scendent perfect individual concept, some problems will arise. If we have infinite 
time in the afterlife to promote our moral perfection, and deserved happiness 
will directly be guaranteed by God, then: (1) Our actions and moral state in our 
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lifetime would be trivial—we will easily indulge in evil in our lifetime and simply 
think to pay the price in the afterlife. This is Kant’s reason for preferring the du-
alistic system, (2) In fact, our duty would not be the highest good, but only moral 
perfection, because the task of distributing happiness belongs fully to God and 
has nothing to do with human beings, and (3) Because our deeds in our lifetime 
would become trivial, we cannot see any reactions in this world to our moral 
actions, meaning that the assumption of the afterlife is just another castle in the 
sky that has nothing to do with this life. As a result, this understanding would not 
only sever all connection between the highest good and the actual world, but also 
jettison its capacity to act as moral confirmation.
In fact, if we analyze the highest good as the effect of a moral duty (i.e., the 
belief of the necessary realization of this effect is just the moral confirmation), we 
will find that it is essentially a communal concept. This effect can be seen to 
 derive from all our duties, especially the duty of benevolence that involves the 
happiness of others,17 toward the aspect of ideal generalization of the individual 
effects of these duties in all human beings. Accordingly, everyone who executes 
all her duties will become the cause of the happiness of others and the highest 
good is just the result that should be caused by the human species itself, if all 
human beings can execute all their duties successfully. Hence, the transcendent 
perfect highest good should be combined with the concept of the community. In 
this case, we do not see our deserved happiness in the afterlife as directly distrib-
uted by God. By contrast, the afterlife should be an ideal human community inso-
far as everyone is just the cause of the deserved happiness of everyone. In other 
words, the human species itself should be the cause of the highest good. This 
community also cannot be constituted by God, whose task only consists of making 
the human afterlife possible and liberating human beings from the natural limita-
tions that hinder them from realizing their moral end. Rather this community 
should be established gradually by the striving of every generation of human 
beings.
Only through this conception of the transcendent perfect communal highest 
good can we solve the previous problems of the highest good as the transcendent 
perfect individual concept. Firstly, our deeds in our lifetime are no longer trivial, 
because we should establish this ideal human community gradually by ourselves 
 17 In this sense, the happiness is not as an end itself but only as a relevant object required by the moral 
duty. This would not make the moral duty heteronomous but would still retain its autonomous 
character. For a detailed exposition about the relation between the duty of benevolence and the 
happiness in the highest good one can see Kleingeld (2016) 33–49, Marwede (2016) 51–69 and 
Stephen Engstrom, “The Determination of the Concept of the Highest Good,” ed. Thomas Höwing, 
The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy (Berlin/Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter, 2016) 94n6, 
99–103.
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through carrying out our duties and through the same strivings of every genera-
tion of human beings. Otherwise, the afterlife would be useless in realizing the 
highest good. Secondly, the distribution of the deserved happiness of everyone 
would be the effects of our own duty, because we can be the causes of the deserved 
happiness of one another through an ideal community in the afterlife. Thirdly, the 
connection of this kind of the highest good with the actual world can be demon-
strated by Kant’s philosophy of politics and history.
As an example, we can use Kant’s view of the necessary appearance of the 
ideal political organization of a state from human nature in Toward Perpetual 
Peace. For Kant, whether the human is intentional or unintentional, an ideal 
political constitution will automatically appear in the human social community 
(ZeF, 8: 366). Because this is the destiny that reason gives to humanity, even if 
all human beings were to act egoistically, they would finally choose to make an 
equal and mutually beneficial state, as long as they perform the ideal rational 
calculation. Kant also thinks that even a state of devils would be the same, as long 
as they have reason.
In fact, this ideal political community is already a part of the external form of 
the highest good, because in this community everyone executes their own duties 
(at least the duties of right) and prevents human happiness from unjust infringe-
ment, although one may not be doing this out of duty. Kant also says: “It is not the 
case that a good state constitution is to be expected from inner morality; on the 
contrary, the good moral education of a people is to be expected from a good state 
constitution” (ibid.). This suggests that we can further expect that the more com-
plete highest good can develop on the basis of the ideal political constitution, and 
that its accomplishment will manifest as an ethical community in that everyone 
not only obeys the laws of right, but also the laws of virtue (RGV, 6: 94). This eth-
ical community is almost the complete form of the highest good, because in it all 
moral duties will be executed, and everyone will cause the happiness of everyone 
else, as long as God revokes the natural limitations that obstruct the realization of 
human duties. For Kant, the church is just an imperfect imitation of this kind of 
ethical community in the actual world.
According to this foreseeable progress of human history, the political consti-
tution, and the existence of ethical communities in this world, we can believe that 
the actual world is not entirely set apart from morality, since such events are all 
signs of the promotion of the highest good in this actual world and proof of the 
close connection of our present life with the moral ultimate purpose. This is just 
the function of the highest good as moral confirmation
According to our previous analysis, then, the combination of the transcendent 
perfect highest good with the concept of an ideal social community can provide 
the most consistent doctrine of the highest good. According to the concept of the 
community, the highest good is firstly developed by the human being itself in a 
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maximal form, namely an ideal political community. This community has a con-
nection to everyone, because its development is necessary through the striving of 
every generation of human beings. But this maximal form still falls short of the 
complete highest good, since it remains an external form of the highest good and 
is unable to overcome the natural limitations of the human being. In this case, the 
transcendent concept can help us conceive that God will eliminate these natural 
hindrances in our afterlife and guarantee that we can be the causes of one anoth-
er’s deserved happiness. Finally, the concept of perfection requires an endless 
afterlife insofar as we can fairly, through our moral striving, attain holiness, and 
become worthy of beatitude. Thus, the most reasonable concept of the highest 
good should be a transcendent perfect communal concept.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that a tenable doctrine of the highest good should, 
through Kant’s concept of the nature dialectic and the doctrine of radical evil, 
understand the highest good as moral confirmation, for only such a reading can 
adequately explain the necessity of the highest good and its relationship to the 
moral law. As a result, the concept of the highest good that best corresponds to 
this understanding is a transcendent perfect communal one, which entails the con-
cepts of immanence, justice, and the individual at the same time. The concept 
of transcendence guarantees the complete realization of human happiness; the 
concept of perfection guarantees a fair amount of space for moral striving; and 
the concept of the community guarantees the connection with the actual world. 
This understanding of the highest good neither violates nor abandons any moment 
of Kant’s whole philosophical system. On the contrary, it provides the grounds 
to explain the necessity and the function of its different branches, just like his 
philosophies of religion, politics, and history. This is also an indirect proof of the 
validity of this understanding of the highest good.
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